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bUniversity of Go¨ttingen, GermanySummary.— Large-scale agricultural investments (LSAIs) in general and their socio-economic implications in particular have been heav-
ily debated in recent years.While some claim that LSAIs are an important catalyst for development in neglected rural areas, others caution
that they pose a risk to rural communities’ livelihoods. The extent to which LSAIs provide beneﬁts for local communities is hence still
contested. This paper sets out to conceptually understand what eﬀects the establishment of a large-scale farm has on the rural labor market
in low- and middle-income countries. In addition, we empirically address the question of whether large-scale farming as recorded in the
Land Matrix creates or destroys employment. We develop a transition matrix to identify several scenarios based on key determinants of
the direct employment creation potential of LSAIs, namely the former land use, the crop type and the production model. We empirically
assess the actual importance of these scenarios and the employment creation to be expected from this sample of LSAIs based on labor
intensities. We further look into the net employment eﬀects for land formerly used by smallholder farmers. Our analysis shows that LSAIs
massively crowd out smallholder farmers, which is only partially mitigated through the cultivation of labor intensive crops and the appli-
cation of contract farming schemes. This holds true for all regions targeted by LSAIs, although regional diﬀerences are found in terms of
magnitude. The paper concludes that these eﬀects tend to be large on the local scale (i.e., in the immediate surroundings of the investment
site) but small in relation to total national employment in agriculture. However, indirect employment creation related to LSAIs, which is
discussed but not empirically addressed in this paper, needs to be taken into account to have the full picture.
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The demand for land suitable for agricultural production is
growing globally (Lambin & Meyfroidt, 2011). A major driver
is the increased demand for food and energy of growing pop-
ulations worldwide (Scheidel & Sorman, 2012). In this context
the expansion of large-scale commercial farming is seen as a
potential solution 1 to satisfy this demand (Deininger, 2013).
In the last decade investors have been increasingly acquiring
land in developing countries for huge farming operations
(Nolte, Chamberlain, & Giger, 2016). The media have coined
this phenomenon ‘‘land grabbing”; a more neutral term is
‘‘large-scale agricultural investments” (LSAIs). The term
‘‘LSAI” 2 is also more precise since it excludes cases of specu-
lation and only considers land acquisitions that result in an
operational farm.
Such investments, in general, and the socio-economic impli-
cations of these investments, in particular, have been heavily
debated in recent years (Ali, Deininger, & Harris, 2017;
Baumgartner, von Braun, Abebaw, & Mu¨ller, 2015; Collier &
Venables, 2012; Cotula, 2013; German, Schoneveld, &
Mwangi, 2013; Herrmann, 2017; Kleemann & Thiele, 2015;
Messerli, Giger, Dwyer, Breu, & Eckert, 2014). The implica-
tions such investments have for target countries’ agricultural
sectors and, more speciﬁcally, for rural employment are still
contested. The creation of jobs is one of the most important
and common pledges investors make to local communities
and governments when acquiring land; although, the actual
realization of this commitment is often debated: while some
see potential for employment creation (Baumgartner et al.,
2015; Kleemann & Thiele, 2015), others fear that the most430vulnerable parts of society will lose their means of existence
(Li, 2011). Obviously, whether and to what extent these invest-
ments turn out to beneﬁt host countries critically hinges on the
potential for employment creation, particularly for those who
lose their land without compensation. Although past experi-
ences with large farms have been largely negative, recent
changes in the context conditions have given reason to believe
that large farms may have a future (Deininger & Byerlee,
2012) andmay actually contribute to increasedwelfare and pov-
erty reduction due to employment creation (Deininger & Xia,
2016; Herrmann, 2017; Van den Broeck, Swinnen, &
Maertens, 2017).
Moreover, generating employment is a key component of
economic and social development and, thus, of poverty allevi-
ation (World Bank, 2012) — an issue ranked high on most
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cesses typically go hand in hand with declining shares of agri-
cultural sectors’ gross domestic product (GDP) contributions
and decreasing employment in agricultural sectors (Chenery
& Syrquin, 1975; Foster & Rosenzweig, 2007; Kuznets,
1957; U¨ngo¨r, 2013). In other words, the shift from
agriculture-based economies toward industrialized or service-
oriented economies seems to be a necessary precondition for
development. In many poor countries, the agricultural sector
continues to be the backbone of the economy and employs a
large share of the population. Development processes often
focus on urban areas and leave rural populations behind
(Headey, Bezemer, & Hazell, 2010). Against this logic, large-
scale farms in rural areas could hence shoulder the burden
of creating agricultural wage employment, for instance, by
(i) satisfying labor demand by directly employing former land
users and (ii) stimulating the local economy and creating
employment opportunities outside the agricultural sector
through sectoral linkages. Moreover, establishing a large-
scale farm might have further implications for the local econ-
omy, such as lower food prices and greater access to new tech-
nologies, to name but a few. Depending on the extent to which
these eﬀects materialize, they could alleviate poverty (Irz, Lin,
Thirtle, & Wiggins, 2001; Maertens & Swinnen, 2009).
This paper seeks to conceptually understand the eﬀects the
establishment of a large-scale farm has on the rural labor mar-
ket in low- and middle-income countries. Moreover, it
addresses the question of whether large-scale farming creates
or destroys employment when compared with the previous
activity carried out on the land in question (e.g., smallholder
farming). To do this, we provide relevant background infor-
mation on rural labor markets in general and the labor pro-
ductivities and intensities in the agricultural sector in
particular in Section 2. In Section 3 we elaborate on the direct
labor market eﬀects that occur once a large-scale farm is set
up. For these direct eﬀects, we identify and discuss three key
determinants which are decisive for the employment creation
potential of LSAIs: (i) the former land-use type, (ii) the crop
cultivated, and (iii) the production model applied. Based on
these determinants, we develop diﬀerent scenarios and illus-
trate them in a transition matrix. In Section 4 we present the
data for our empirical application. In Section 5 we empirically
assess the employment creation in three steps: First, we assess
small-scale and large-scale labor intensities based on data
from the Land Matrix Global Observatory 3 and the FAO
smallholder data portrait. Second, we assess which scenarios
are actually occurring in reality and derive implications for
the labor market. Third, we estimate the net employment eﬀect
for LSAIs on former smallholder land in selected countries. In
Section 6 we elaborate on further indirect eﬀects and discuss
the validity and limitations of our ﬁndings, before concluding
in Section 7.2. RURAL LABOR MARKETS AND LABOR PRODUC-
TIVITY
(a) Rural labor markets
In rural areas of low- and middle-income countries, agricul-
ture is the main source of employment and income
(Rosenzweig, 1988). In 2010, 24% of the workforce in low-
and middle-income countries was employed in agriculture,
while agriculture’s contribution to GDP was at 10% (World
Bank, 2016). In those countries heavily targeted by foreign
agricultural investments, the share of workers in the agricul-tural sector is even higher — for instance, 73% in Ethiopia
and 72% in Uganda in 2013 (World Bank, 2016). 4
Over two-thirds of farming activities are performed by self-
employed individuals (Gindling & Newhouse, 2014); wage and
salary employees are mainly found in the processing industry.
Agricultural wage employment opportunities exist predomi-
nantly only for casual and seasonal workers, which can be
explained by the seasonality of agricultural production. For
most crops, there are clear seasonal peaks (e.g., toward harvest
times) during which times labor demand is high (Nolte &
Subakanya, 2016; Rosenzweig, 1988). In addition to being lim-
ited in terms of quantity, those temporary jobs are also limited
with regard to quality. Major diﬀerences between regular and
irregular wage employment can be found in the working con-
ditions, social protection, and entitlements and beneﬁts for
workers (International Labour Organisation (ILO), 2003).
Labor supply in rural areas is considered to be inﬁnite. Even
in areas where new labor opportunities open up, the supply
remains high due to people migrating into these areas
(Taylor & Martin, 2001). A major constraint in rural areas
is that the workforce typically lacks the training to perform
high-skill tasks (Collier & Dercon, 2014).
Jobs created by LSAIs are often earmarked for wage work-
ers. In some cases self-employment opportunities are provided
through contract farming. A smallholder farmer’s decision on
whether to switch from self- to wage employment is mainly
driven by the social opportunity costs of the self-employed
(shadow wages). Smallholders will only decide to enter wage
employment or release family members to work on a large-
scale farm if the drop in proﬁts is compensated by the wage
earned on the large-scale farm. More precisely, wages paid
on large-scale farms have to be equal to or exceed the marginal
revenue product of smallholder farmers (Barrett, Sherlund, &
Adesina, 2007).
Another aspect of wage employment created on large-scale
farms is that it contributes to the formalization of the agricul-
tural sector, from self-employed smallholder farming to wage
employment. This in turn increases the ﬁscal revenue of an
economy since larger holdings are more likely to be formally
registered and hence taxable compared to smallholders (Irz
et al., 2001); this is despite the fact that investors in agriculture
enjoy considerable tax beneﬁts in many countries (Cotula,
Vermeulen, Leonard, & Keeley, 2009).
(b) Agricultural labor productivity and labor intensity
As countries develop, their agricultural sectors lose impor-
tance. This can be illustrated by comparing the share of people
employed in agriculture and the sector’s contribution to GDP
in low- and middle-income countries over time. During 2000–
10, the share of the workforce engaged in agriculture almost
halved from 45% to 24%. Within the same period the agricul-
tural sector’s contribution to GDP only decreased by 23%
(from 13% to 10%) (World Bank, 2016). The sharp drop in
agricultural employment compared with the more modest
decrease in agriculture’s GDP contribution clearly points to
increased labor productivity. In other words, less labor input
is required to produce the same level of output. Labor produc-
tivity measures employment eﬃciency and is deﬁned as output
per unit of labor input during a period of time.
Generally speaking, (agricultural) labor productivity varies
largely across countries. In 2015 the agriculture value added
per worker (in constant 2010 USD) in Norway was more than
four hundred times higher (USD 98,950) than that in Burundi
(USD 231) (World Bank, 2016). These diﬀerences in agricultural
productivity can be explained by a variety of factors: First, poli-
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land and impair productivity (Adamopoulos & Restuccia,
2014). Second, the self-selection of low-skilled workers into the
agricultural sector in developing countries is considered to
decrease agricultural productivity (Gollin, Lagakos, & Waugh,
2014; Lagakos & Waugh, 2013). Third diﬀerent agro-
ecological conditions (e.g., rainfall and soil quality) determine
agricultural productivity and explain diﬀerences (Gallup and
Sachs, 2000). And fourth, diﬀerences in agricultural productivity
areparticularly starkbetween countries in diverse states of devel-
opment. The last point is often rooted in contrasting models of
agricultural production. For instance, large-scale agriculture
accounts for the majority of agricultural production in industri-
alized countries, whereas smallholder and family farming 5 play
an important role in developing countries. Large-scale farms and
smallholder farms also diﬀer in terms of their capital and labor
endowments. While smallholders largely depend on labor,
large-scale farmers often substitute laborwith capital. The extent
towhich such a substitution can take placedependson, inter alia,
the crop itself. The crop determines the labor intensity, i.e., the
amount of labor needed in a production process (Deininger &
Byerlee, 2011). The cropping practice related to these diﬀerent
labor and capital intensities of production further aﬀects agricul-
tural productivity (Bustos, Caprettini, & Ponticelli, 2016).
In agricultural science it is common to use a labor input
measure (labor intensity) instead of an output measure (labor
productivity). Labor intensity (LI) is deﬁned as the amount
of labor needed in a production process and is calculated as
the number of workers required to cultivate one hectare of a
speciﬁc crop:
LI ¼ Number of workers on the farm
Area in production ðhectareÞ
Two main crop classes are often distinguished based on their
cultivation patterns: annual crops and perennial crops.
Annual crops (e.g., wheat, corn, and soya beans) perform an
entire life cycle in one season and have to be replanted every
year. Since the process from planting to harvest can be largely
performed with the aid of machinery, annual crops are consid-
ered capital intensive. Subsequently, there is a great deal of
scope for capital to replace labor. On the contrary, perennial
crops (e.g., tea, coﬀee, and bananas) persist for many growing
seasons. Planting, caring for, and harvesting these (typically
tree) crops require more labor input. They thus provide less
scope to substitute labor for capital and are considered rather
labor intensive. Therefore, in terms of labor input, there are
signiﬁcant diﬀerences between crops for which labor can easily
be substituted by capital. For instance, Deininger and Byerlee
(2011) ﬁnd that oil palm and (manual) sugar cane generate 10–
30 times as many jobs compared with mechanized grain farm-
ing. Hence, for perennials, key operations potentially vary lit-
tle between large-scale and smallholder farms and,
accordingly, labor intensities are similar. This is not the case
for mechanized grain production, where large diﬀerences exist
between smallholder and large-scale farms (Deininger &
Byerlee, 2011). In these cases a hectare under smallholder pro-
duction is typically thought to employ more people than a hec-
tare under mechanized large-scale farming.3. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The establishment of a new large-scale farm implies the
transition from a certain former land use to large-scale farm-
ing. This has far-reaching consequences on the rural labor
market. We distinguish direct and indirect employment cre-ation: Direct employment creation can be directly linked to
the operation on the farm. These eﬀects typically become vis-
ible immediately with the farm establishment. Indirect
employment creation, in turn, concerns employment creation
that is triggered by the farm operation but does not occur
on the actual farm. These eﬀects can occur immediately but
typically occur in the medium- and long-term when sectoral
changes become eﬀective (forward- and backward linkages).
In our conceptual framework and the empirical application
we focus on changing labor requirements due to direct
employment creation and discuss the indirect employment
eﬀects in 6(a) 6().
In order to conceptualize how the establishment of a large-
scale farm in a rural context can directly aﬀect the labor mar-
ket, we illustrate diﬀerent scenarios (1a–5d) in a transition
matrix (Table 1). Accordingly, the direct employment eﬀects
depend on three factors: (i) the former land-use, as it determi-
nes whether and to what extent crowding out of labor takes
place, (ii) the type of crop cultivated, as labor intensity diﬀers
between crops, and (iii) the production model, which could
mitigate the crowding out of smallholder farmers. The labor
demands of new farms vary over time. In the initial stages land
preparation and infrastructure development contribute to
employment creation. But once the farm is operational, the
crops produced and the production model applied are the
decisive factors behind further employment creation. We are
interested in longer-term employment prospectives and thus
only consider the employment creation of operational farms.
The former land use determines the loss of employment. A
newly established farm leads to a change in land use and all
former income-generating activities on the land cease to exist.
We distinguish between investments on farmland already used
for large-scale agriculture (1a–1d, brownﬁeld) and the estab-
lishment of an entirely new farm (greenﬁeld) on land formerly
used for smallholder agriculture (2a–2d), pastoralism (3a–3d),
forestry (4a–4d), or conservation (5a–5d).
Labor requirements for the new large-scale farm largely
depend on the crops or, more precisely, on the labor and cap-
ital intensity of crop production (as discussed in 5(a) 5()).
Accordingly, we diﬀerentiate between labor-intensive and
capital-intensive crops in our transition matrix.
We further account for diﬀerent production models in that
we distinguish between investors who introduce contract farm-
ing schemes (CF) and those who do not (no CF). Contract
farming schemes are thought of as a solution to preserve
smallholder employment and achieve considerable social ben-
eﬁts for participating farmers (Deininger & Byerlee, 2012;
Kleemann & Thiele, 2015). The term ‘‘contract farming” refers
to agreements between a farmer and a ﬁrm. Under such an
agreement, a farmer is required to provide a certain quantity
and quality of commodity that is either produced on the farm-
er’s own land or on land acquired by the investor but worked
by the farmer. In turn, the investor provides production sup-
port and processes the farmer’s produce or puts it on the mar-
ket (Eaton & Shepherd, 2001). Regardless of whether leased or
non-leased, in both cases jobs are largely maintained and —
depending on the speciﬁc contract arrangements — produc-
tion conditions might improve, for instance, through the pro-
vision of credit; agricultural inputs in the form of seeds,
fertilizer, and pesticides; and training in production methods.
Contract farming is a highly debated practice in the literature
(Baumann, 2000; Simmons, 2002). On the one hand, such
arrangements are criticized because of the unequal power rela-
tionship between the smallholder and the investor, which
could lead to the latter exploiting the former. On the other
hand, it is considered an opportunity to include local farmers
Table 1. Transition matrix
Former land use Final land use
Large-scale farm
Labor intensive crops Capital intensive crops
no CF CF no CF CF
Brownﬁeld investments Large-scale agriculture 1a 1b 1c 1d
Greenﬁeld investments Smallholder agriculture 2a 2b 2c 2d
Pastoralists 3a 3b 3c 3d
Forestry 4a 4b 4c 4d
Conservation 5a 5b 5c 5d
Source: Author’s compilation.
Note: CF = contract farming.
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investments (De Schutter, 2011; Robertson & Pinstrup-
Andersen, 2010).
(a) Scenarios for brownﬁeld investments
For scenarios 1a–1d, we would expect new investments to
take over existing farms. In this case there would be no crowd-
ing out of smallholder agriculture or other income-generating
activities of local communities; although employees of the pre-
vious farm might still be released. Therefore, the net employ-
ment eﬀect is strongly driven by the labor intensity of the
cultivated crops and the question of whether contract-
farming schemes are applied or not. If the investor decides
to plant more labor-intensive crops (1a+1b), we would expect
a more positive employment eﬀect than if the investor were to
opt for capital-intensive crops (1c+1d) under high mechaniza-
tion. This positive eﬀect might be further stimulated if the
investor implements contract-farming schemes, which would
oﬀer employment opportunities to smallholder farmers in
the region.
(b) Scenarios for greenﬁeld investments
If new farms are established on land that was not formerly
used for large-scale agriculture, former land use plays a more
pronounced role since jobs connected to the land’s former use
will be lost. This holds particularly true for investments in sce-
narios 2a–2d, which target land that was formerly used for
smallholder agriculture. Accordingly, we expect displacements
and massive crowding out of smallholder employment. In the
scenarios 3a–3d we expect pastoralists to be crowded out,
while in scenarios 4a–4d we expect labor engaged in forestry
to be crowded out. Conservation areas often serve various
purposes, such as hunting, ﬁshing, and gathering of ﬁrewood.
Therefore, these activities would be expected to cease in sce-
narios 5a–5d. Generally speaking, we expect low crowding
out of former employment on land formerly used for forestry
and conservation (scenarios 4a–5d) due to the relatively low
labor demand for forestry, which ranges between 0.02 and
0.04 workers per hectare (Bustos et al., 2016; Deininger &
Byerlee, 2011).
Similar to brownﬁeld investments, employment is created
according to the crops that are cultivated and the business
model: labor intensive crops (a+b of scenarios 2–5) are more
likely to preserve existing jobs or even generate additional
employment opportunities, which could lead to net employ-
ment creation. With capital-intensive crops (c+d of scenarios
2–5), the newly created employment might not compensate
the employment that was crowded out in the ﬁrst place. Some
investment projects implement contract-farming schemes (b+dof scenarios 2–5), which could — similarly to labor-intensive
crops — mitigate the crowding out of employment linked to
diﬀerent former land uses.
In sum, the net employment eﬀect is driven by the combina-
tion of these three aspects in each acquisition, ranging from
massive crowding out and very few new employment opportu-
nities to hardly any crowding out mitigated by contract-
farming schemes and many new jobs. The negative eﬀects
are prone to be strongest for former greenﬁelds which experi-
enced high crowding out of former employment — speciﬁcally,
former smallholder farms. The cultivation of labor-intensive
crops might mitigate the loss through substantive labor
demand, while capital-intensive crops are expected to generate
only limited employment. If contract-farming schemes are
implemented, the crowding out of former employment can
be reduced and smallholder farmers can partake in the devel-
opment process of the region.4. DATA
In our empirical analysis we mainly draw on two databases.
For LSAIs, we use data from the most comprehensive data-
base on large-scale land acquisitions, the Land Matrix
(retrieved on 1 August 2016). We include all concluded agri-
cultural deals (both oral agreement and signed contract) above
two hundred hectares. 6 Our data sample contains 1,346 deals
amounting to 35.2 million hectares. The Land Matrix contains
comprehensive information on individual large-scale farming
projects with exact ﬁgures for the acquired area. In particular,
it feeds the transition matrix with information on the (i) for-
mer land use, (ii) the type of crop cultivated including its
respective current size under production and current number
of workers, and (iii) the production model by capturing
contract-farming schemes (with information on the area used
for contract farming and the respective number of contract
farmers, either inside or outside of the land acquired by an
investor).
The land acquired by investors often contains multiple
entries for several of these categories. If the share of these dif-
ferent entries is not given, we assume equal shares for each
entry. For those cases of contract farming, where the actual
area for contract farming is not given, we assume that contract
farmers cultivate the entire acquired area.
To assess the employment loss from the former land use
smallholder farming we draw on the FAO’s Smallholder
Farmers’ Dataportrait 7 — a standardized smallholder-
speciﬁc database that consists of Living Standards Measure-
ment Study (LSMS) survey data and FAO Rural Income Gen-
erating Activities (RIGA) data. We use this to estimate the
labor intensity of smallholder farmers (see 5(i) 5()).
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potential (see 5(b) 5()), we use ﬁve African low- and middle-
income countries covered by the Smallholder Farmers’ Data-
portrait: Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Uganda.
For these countries, Land Matrix and FAO data overlap
and provide a solid basis for a cross-country comparison.5. EMPIRICAL APPLICATION
(a) Labor intensities
In the ﬁrst step of our empirical analysis, we derive and
compare the labor intensities of large-scale and smallholder
farmers. This allows us to distinguish labor and capital inten-
sive crops which is an important precondition to study actual
employment eﬀects. Based on the labor intensities, we can esti-
mate the loss of employment from land formerly used for
smallholder farming as well as the employment creation on
now commercially farmed land.
(i) Smallholder agriculture
For smallholder agriculture, labor intensity is derived from
the number of workers (family and hired workers) on a small-
holder farm and the size of the farm as reported in FAO’s
Smallholder Farmers’ Dataportrait. Both measures are
median-weighted averages aggregated on country level.
Because of its level of aggregation, the smallholder data do
not account for individual crops, former uses, or production
models. However, since the data set is derived from national
labor surveys and household surveys and only addresses small-
holder farmers, it reﬂects country-speciﬁc cropping patterns —
that is, the data capture the typical crops cultivated and the
respective labor intensity level for each crop. Therefore, the
derived estimate can be considered — in the country context
— a good estimate of smallholder labor intensity.
Based on the FAO data, we consider smallholder labor
intensities to range between 1.13 and 3.77 workers per hectare
(see also Table 3 below in (c)), with a mean of 1.77 and a med-
ian of 1.26.
(ii) Large-scale agriculture
For our large-scale agriculture labor intensity estimate per
crop 8, we use Land Matrix data. To cater for the diﬀering
labor demand under contract farming arrangements, we calcu-
late intensities for such cases separately. 9
In the following, we look at the labor intensities of some key
crops, determined by their frequency in the Land Matrix. We
assume that labor intensities are similar across world regions.0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
Rice
Cassava (Maniok)
Cotton
Corn (Maize)
Sugar Cane
Wheat
Soya Beans
Sun Flower
Barley
Rapeseed
Labour intensity (worker per hectare)
Annual
Figure 1. Labor intensities for maj
Source: Author’s calculation based on The LThis is a strong supposition given that agro-ecological condi-
tions, such as rainfall and soil quality, vary largely across
world regions. Our assumption, however, may be justiﬁed
given (i) the highly mechanized mode of production in large-
scale agriculture, which is comparable across the globe, and
(ii) the fact that agro-ecological conditions predetermine crop-
ping patterns — for example, certain crops are only cultivated
if the operation is thought to be proﬁtable. We consider the
derived estimates to be a valid approximation of diﬀerences
in the labor intensities of various crops but are fully aware that
one overall value will not be able to precisely reﬂect labor
demands across the world.
Figure 1 shows labor intensities for annual and perennial
crops and conﬁrms that indeed annual crops have lower inten-
sities. Nevertheless, there is some variance and hence some
exceptions to this rule. For instance, rice shows a rather high
labor demand of over 0.6 workers per hectare despite being
considered a capital-intensive annual crop. However, this is
not due to the natural characteristic of the plant but rather
due to the way it is commercially cultivated. Although a peren-
nial crop by nature, rice is usually replanted every year in
order to generate higher yields. Similarly, cotton is cut down
every year to prevent disease and pest infestation even though
it can survive several growing seasons. We also ﬁnd hetero-
geneity in terms of labor intensities among perennial crops.
Typically, such perennials are commercially produced on plan-
tations. Due to their physical characteristics, some of these
crops (e.g., tea, bananas, and coﬀee) are indeed quite labor
intensive, while others (e.g., rubber, cocoa, and palm oil) are
less labor intensive (International Labour Organisation
(ILO), 1994). In the latter group of crops it is easier to substi-
tute labor with capital.
We check the labor intensities derived from Land Matrix
data against reports on labor intensity in the literature (see
Table 4). Generally speaking, we ﬁnd similar labor intensities.
These empirical ﬁndings show that the classiﬁcation of annu-
als and perennials reﬂects potential labor intensity quite well,
although not perfectly. In the following empirical applications
we hence do not use strict annual versus perennial crops as cat-
egories but categorize crops as either labor intensive or capital
intensive. In general, the labor-intensive category consists of
perennial crops; however, we also include those annual crops
which are more labor intensive and exclude those perennial
crops which, relatively speaking, are less labor intensive. The
capital-intensive category typically comprises annual crops,
though some labor-intensive annuals are excluded, while some
perennial crops with low labor intensities are included.
To now distinguish labor-intensive from capital-intensive
crops, we feed labor intensities of annual and perennial crops0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
Pulses
Accacia
Rubber
Cacao
Oil Palm
Alfalfa
Coffee Plant
Jatropha
Banana
Tea
Labour intensity (worker per hectare)
Perennial
or annual and perennial crops.
and Matrix Global Observatory (2016).
Figure 2. Frequency and density of labor intensity by crop class.
Source: Author’s calculation based on The Land Matrix Global Observatory (2016).
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tion (kernel density). The point of intersection is used to derive
the threshold between labor and capital intensity. Figure 2
shows that this point is at a labor intensity of 0.576 workers
per hectare. Consequently, we deﬁne all crops above 0.576
workers per hectare as labor intensive, and all crops below
that threshold as capital intensive.
(b) Transition to large-scale farming
(i) Global overview on diﬀerent scenarios
We now address the transition from the former land use to
large-scale farming by using the transition matrix (introduced
in Section 3) to illustrate how the total acquired area is dis-
tributed across each of the following three key factors: (i)
the former land-use (large-scale agriculture, smallholder agri-
culture, pastoralists, forestry, and conservation); (ii) the labor
intensity of the crop cultivated (labor intensive, capital inten-
sive; see 5(a) 5()); and (iii) the production model applied (con-
tract farming, no contract farming). As a result, we can
estimate the area that is transformed from the respective for-
mer land use to large-scale farming, taking into account the
crops planted and the production models applied. Table 2
shows the transition matrix with the former land-use and the
respective ﬁnal land-use based on Land Matrix data. We use
the acquired area (expressed as percentage of the total
acquired area) as a measure; the areas’ sizes in hectares can
be found in Table 5.
Relating the derived estimates to the potential employment
eﬀect of each key determinant reveals that over three-quarters
of the land acquired has previously been used for agriculture
— 44% for large-scale agriculture and another 34% for small-
holder agriculture. Meanwhile, 13% of the land targeted was
formerly used for forestry; 5%, by pastoralists; and 4%, for
conservation. This global overview on former land use sug-gests that investors do not primarily target ‘‘idle” land.
Instead, targeted land has usually been used for agriculture
before suggesting that crowding out of former employment
can be expected. 10
Looking at the crop type, we ﬁnd a clear majority of the
area used to cultivate capital-intensive crops (75%). This sug-
gests a rather low employment creation potential for most
LSAIs as capital-intensive crops indicate a highly mechanized
production with low labor inputs.
In total, LSAIs only implement contract-farming schemes
on 2 out of every 10 hectares. This is more often the case
for capital-intensive crops (17%) compared to labor intensive
crops (3%).
We now look into the diﬀerent scenarios of the transition
matrix. For brownﬁeld investments, i.e., land formerly used
by large-scale farms (1a–1d, 44%), we do not expect a crowd-
ing out of former employment. The share of capital-intensive
crops (40%, with and without contract farming) is eight times
higher than the share of labor-intensive crops (5%). In contrast
to other former uses, contract-farming schemes are relatively
common and applied on almost one-third of the area formerly
used for large-scale agriculture (adding up the percentages of
labor intensive and capital intensive crops, see explanation
on within group comparisons 11), especially for capital-
intensive crops. Given that crowding out of former employ-
ment is considered limited, positive employment eﬀects might
occur in this scenario even in the dominating case with capital-
intensive crops, especially if contract farming schemes are
applied.
Over one-third of the land area has previously been used by
smallholder farmers (2a–2d), implying a potential crowding
out of this former employment. This crowding out is only par-
tially mitigated through the cultivation of labor-intensive
crops (41%) or through contract-farming schemes (15%). We
hence expect that potential employment losses are rather high
Table 2. Transition matrix — Results as percent of the area acquired (n = 1,031)
Former land use Final land use Total
Large-scale farm
Labor intensive Capital intensive
25% 75%
no CF CF no CF CF
Brownﬁeld investment Large-scale agriculture 1a 1b 1c 1d
Acquired area (%) 3% 2% 28% 12% 44%
Greenﬁeld investment Smallholder agriculture 2a 2b 2c 2d
Acquired area (%) 12% 1% 16% 4% 34%
Pastoralists 3a 3b 3c 3d
Acquired area (%) 2% <1% 3% <1% 5%
Forestry 4a 4b 4c 4d
Acquired area (%) 6% <1% 6% 1% 13%
Conservation 5a 5b 5c 5d
Acquired area (%) <1% <1% 3% <1% 4%
Total (%) 22% 3% 57% 17% 100%
Total (#) 183 66 611 171 1,031
Source: Author’s calculation based on The Land Matrix Global Observatory (2016).
Notes: Total can vary due to rounding. CF = contract farming.
Table 3. Employment creation through LSAIs for selected countries (scenarios 2a–2d)
Country(a) Labor intensive Capital intensive Total As % of
employment
in agriculture(b)
no CF CF no CF CF
Ethiopia
(LI = 1.24; n = 43)
Gross employment creation through new large-scale farm 106,775 529 31,445 9,329 148,078 0.48%
Crowding out of former smallholders on acquired area 137,000 458 149,034 29,760 316,252 1.03%
Net employment eﬀect 22% 16% 79% 69% 53% 0.55%
Kenya
(LI = 3.77; n = 6)
Gross employment creation through new large-scale farm 76,507 7,179 n/a 687 84,373 0.39%
Crowding out of former smallholders on acquired area 301,600 16,965 n/a 10,682 329,247 1.53%
Net employment eﬀect 75% 58% n/a 94% 74% 1.14%
Nigeria
(LI = 1.43; n = 32)
Gross employment creation through new large-scale farm 23,450 28,272 9,870 113,449 175,042 1.18%
Crowding out of former smallholders on acquired area 47,428 50,306 39,087 278,188 415,009 2.80%
Net employment eﬀect 51% 44% 75% 59% 58% 1.62%
Tanzania
(LI = 1.26; n = 10)
Gross employment creation through new large-scale farm 16,820 16,675 n/a 5,225 38,721 0.29%
Crowding out of former smallholders on acquired area 21,672 13,469 n/a 14,616 49,757 0.37%
Net employment eﬀect 22% 24% n/a 64% 22% 0.08%
Uganda
(LI = 1.13; n = 8)
Gross employment creation through new large-scale farm 2,133 947 n/a 11,363 14,443 0.15%
Crowding out of former smallholders on acquired area 2,837 1,363 n/a 29,821 34,022 0.34%
Net employment eﬀect 25% 31% n/a 62% 58% 0.20%
Source: Author’s calculation based on The Land Matrix Global Observatory (2016) and International Labour Organisation (ILO) (2016).
Notes: (a) Labor intensities (LI) of smallholder farmers and number of LSAIs (n) per country in parenthesis.
(b) The ﬁgures on employment in agriculture correspond to the latest available year per country.
CF = contract farming.
436 WORLD DEVELOPMENTin the majority of cases where land formerly used by small-
holders is targeted. This speciﬁc scenario will be looked at in
greater detail in 5(c) 5().
On former pastoralist land (3a–3d, 5%) it is likely that pas-
toralists will be crowded out once the land is transferred to a
large-scale farmer. According to our ﬁndings, capital-intensive
crops dominate (66%) — which impairs the (new) employment
generation — and there is almost no evidence of contract
farming (4%). Therefore, we expect the majority of deals on
former pastoralist land to result in employment losses.
We ﬁnd capital-intensive crops on more than half of the
land (57%) formerly used for forestry (4a–4d, 13%). Moreover,
only a small share (12%) of former forestry land is farmed
under contract-farming schemes. However, considering the
generally low labor requirements of the former forestry land,on those areas where labor-intensive crops are cultivated
(43%) and where contract farming is applied, we expect rather
positive employment creation potential.
The same holds for former conservation land (5a–5d, 4%),
which is typically characterized by a rather low labor intensity
and does hence not imply a large crowding out of former
employment. The predominant cultivation of capital-
intensive crops without contract farming indicates very limited
employment creation, which might however be positive if there
is indeed no crowding out of former employment.
(ii) Regional perspective
In order to provide a more realistic picture, regional diﬀer-
ences have to be taken into account. Figure 3 shows that the
three key determinants diﬀer across regions.
00.1
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Africa Asia and Paciﬁc Eastern Europe Lan America
Figure 3. Regional perspective according to the key determinants.
Source: Author’s calculation based on The Land Matrix Global Observatory (2016).Note: CF = Contract farming. This ﬁgure also includes deals which lack
the information of the former use but do have information on the crop and/or the production mode.
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agricultural land that had been primarily used by smallholders
(28%) and we also ﬁnd the largest share of former forestry
land (39%) compared to other regions. Former pastoralist
land and conservation areas only constitute 4% and 5%,
respectively. LSAIs in Africa have a clear preference for
capital-intensive crops (66%); however, contract-farming
schemes (36%) are also often applied compared to other
regions. The considerable share of labor-intensive crops
(33%) in combination with the frequent occurrence of contract
farming (36%) has the potential to — at least partly — miti-
gate the crowding out of smallholders and pastoralists in
Africa.
The Asia and Paciﬁc region has the highest share of invest-
ments on former smallholder land (40%) and hence entails thegreatest risk of crowding out. A similar share of the acquired
area was formerly used for large-scale agriculture. Less labor-
intensive forestry and conservation activities were each carried
out on less than 10% of the area. Pastoralists are less common
in the region, accounting for only 3% of the land. Similar to
Africa, though more pronounced, investors in the Asia and
Paciﬁc region concentrate on capital-intensive crops (81%).
The high level of crowding out and the low level of labor-
intensive crops point to negative net employment creation in
the region; although the considerable share of contract farm-
ing (26%) might partly mitigate this.
Two thirds of LSAIs in Eastern Europe target former large-
scale farms, followed by former smallholder land (28%). Sim-
ilar to patterns in Africa and the Asia and Paciﬁc region,
capital-intensive crops (79%) are favored over labor-intensive
438 WORLD DEVELOPMENTcrops (21%). Contract-farming schemes are irrelevant,
accounting for only 2% of the acquired area. Although most
of the investments target large-scale farms, the choice of crops
and production mode make mitigation of the considerably
high crowding out of smallholders unlikely.
As in Eastern Europe, albeit less pronounced, most inves-
tors in Latin America target existing large-scale farms (49%).
Smallholder land accounts for 29% of LSAIs in the region;
pastoralists, 14% (the largest share across all regions); forestry,
7%; and conservation areas, 1%. The crowding out of small-
holders and pastoralists is further accelerated by the prevailing
cultivation of capital-intensive crops (81%). Contract-farming
schemes, which are in place on about one out of every ﬁve hec-
tares, could cushion, without eliminating, the negative eﬀects.
Thus, overall net employment is expected to be negative.
This regional analysis shows that crowding out of former
smallholder farmers is a serious problem across all regions, par-
ticularly in theAsia and Paciﬁc region, whereas the crowding out
of pastoralists is most marked in Latin America. The creation of
new employment and therewith the mitigation of crowding out
through cultivating labor-intensive crops are, generally speak-
ing, rather low but slightly higher in Africa. Contract farming
might be able to mitigate crowding out to some degree — espe-
cially in Africa and to a lesser extent in Latin America and the
Asia and Paciﬁc region but not in Eastern Europe.
Given the preceding empirics of the three determinants in
the diﬀerent world regions, we see very little scope for a posi-
tive direct employment eﬀect across all regions; rather, we
expect high crowding out of existing jobs and relatively few
new jobs to emerge.
(c) Estimation of labor creation potential through LSAIs
Finally, we assess the net employment creation potential for
those countries where Land Matrix and FAO data overlap.
We provide estimates for both smallholder and large-scale
farmers for each of the ﬁve African countries by multiplying
the acquired area with the previously derived labor intensities
(crop-speciﬁc in the case of large-scale agriculture and
country-speciﬁc in the case of smallholder agriculture). This
estimate is based on the size of the acquired area to show
the number of jobs potentially created for each recorded LSAI
if the entire area was cultivated. The diﬀerence between the
number of jobs created by large-scale farmers and the number
of jobs formerly required by smallholders is the potential net
employment eﬀect. We then relate this eﬀect to the total num-
ber of people employed in agriculture in the respective coun-
try. These estimates are meant to give an idea about the
dimensions of potential employment creation but entail
important uncertainties, which we discuss in detail in 6(b) 6().
To derive the respective net employment eﬀect, we contrast
the gross employment of large-scale holdings with the former
form of employment, only looking at land formerly used for
smallholder agriculture (i.e., scenarios 2a–2d of the transition
matrix; see Table 1).
The net employment eﬀect EEnet is deﬁned as the diﬀerence
between the number of jobs created on a newly established
large-scale farm and the number of jobs derived from the for-
mer land-use type (here, smallholder agriculture) expressed as
a percentage of the former use:
EEnet ¼ Jobscommercial  Jobsformer useJobsformer use
Table 3 shows the estimated net employment eﬀect with
respect to the three key determinants in the transition matrix,
focusing on land formerly used by smallholders. To put thetotal value in speciﬁc national contexts, we further report
the employment eﬀect as a percentage of overall employment
in agriculture in the respective country.
Across all countries we encounter a strong negative net
employment eﬀect if a large-scale farm is established on land
formerly used for smallholder agriculture, which is due to high
crowding out. The eﬀect ranges between 22% (Tanzania) and
74% (Kenya). As expected, farms cultivating capital-
intensive crops suﬀer greater job losses than do farms cultivat-
ing labor-intensive crops. Looking into the net employment
eﬀects of labor-intensive crops, the mitigation potential of
contract farming is clearly evident. In fact, we even identify
net employment creation of 16% to 24% for Tanzania and
Ethiopia, respectively. We also ﬁnd lower employment losses
for farms cultivating capital-intensive crops if contract farm-
ing is used.
The last column of Table 3 gives an indication on the mag-
nitude of the net employment eﬀect in the respective country.
The employment losses expressed as a percentage of overall
agricultural employment through LSAIs are relatively small
and range between 0.1% (Tanzania) and 1.6% (Nigeria). This
shows that on a global and national scale, the crowding out of
smallholder farmers and the accompanying net employment
losses are rather small. However, they can be substantial in
the immediate proximity of the investment, especially if there
are no other employment opportunities available in the respec-
tive local labor markets.6. DISCUSSION
Large-scale agricultural investments cause a signiﬁcant loss
of employment on the local level considering the direct
employment creation only. This is mainly due to the crowding
out of former employment, which can only be partially miti-
gated. In this section we also elaborate on the indirect employ-
ment creation of LSAIs and discuss the validity and
limitations of our estimates.
(a) Indirect employment creation
Establishing a large-scale farm does not only have direct
employment eﬀects, as empirically assessed in the preceding
sections, it also has indirect eﬀects that may result in employ-
ment creation not directly linked to farming. One such eﬀect is
related to the inﬂow of capital, which makes new technologies
available (e.g., inputs such as seeds, fertilizer and pesticides,
and machinery). Improved technologies typically increase
labor productivity; this is particularly the case for agricultural
workers on large-scale farms. Depending on the potential of
the spillover eﬀects, advanced technologies might also reach
smallholder farmers, resulting in productivity gains for them,
too. Such productivity gains do three things: First, they
increase the availability of food if food is produced, which
in turn reduces the market price. The reduction of food prices
relative to farm workers’ incomes frees up shares of house-
holds’ budgets, which can then be used to purchase non-
food goods and services. The resulting increase in demand
for industrial goods and services fosters the growth of these
respective sectors (Dorward, 2013). Second, they release labor
from agriculture to other sectors (Dorward, 2013; Timmer,
1988). In short, capital inﬂow into agriculture is expected to
change the sectoral composition from employment in agricul-
ture toward employment in industry and services. Third, they
result in higher total labor incomes (FAO, 2016; Satchi &
Temple, 2009).
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are not labor saving per se and hence do not always trigger a
sectoral shift. For example, Bustos et al. (2016) study two
technological changes in Brazil: the introduction of genetically
engineered soy and the introduction of a second harvesting
season. The former is strongly labor-saving and fosters indus-
trialization processes and a shift of employment toward the
industry and service sectors (as expected). In contrast, a sec-
ond harvesting season is land-augmenting and can hinder
industrialization. In this case, technological change did not
lead to a shift of employment from agriculture toward other
sectors. Kouser, Abedullah, and Qaim (2015) examined the
technological change of introducing insect-resistant bacillus
thuringiensis (Bt) cotton in Pakistan. They found that rather
than reducing agricultural labor demand due to less spraying
of chemical pesticides, the introduction of Bt cotton resulted
in a 55% increase in the demand for hired labor mainly due
to the need to harvest larger yields.
Another eﬀect is related to the potential of large-scale farms
to build productive relationships with other industrial branches
over time (Larson & Shaw, 2001). A common distinction of
these relationships is backward and forward linkages. In the
agricultural context backward linkages describe the intercon-
nection of a large-scale farm with the industrial branch supply-
ing it with inputs (e.g., seeds, fertilizer, and pesticides). The
increased demand for such inputs — induced by large-scale
farms — might trigger the expansion of the upstream industry
and present new employment opportunities. Forward linkages,
on the other hand, comprise all downstream industries process-
ing the farms’ output — for instance, the processing, packing,
and shipping industries. In this case the increased output of
large-scale farmers might lead to an expansion of the process-
ing industry — if processing is done in the target country —
and hence more jobs in the industrial sector. The fact that labor
is released from the agricultural sector due to productivity
gains is conducive to establishing these linkages.
For backward linkages, there is hardly any causal evidence
available in the literature. In cases where a newly established
farm procures inputs locally, we expect jobs to be created
through backward linkages. However, with a highly competi-
tive and increasingly concentrated supply side for the main
agricultural inputs and technologies (for instance, seeds, fertil-
izer and machinery) dominated by a few global players, the
establishment of domestic input supply industries for agricul-
ture is unlikely. Jobs would hence mainly be created through
the (usually locally rooted) service sector — for instance, trade
intermediaries and logistic and shipping companies which
facilitate access to agricultural inputs.
Forward linkages bear potential for the development of the
local industry. The growing output triggered by higher pro-
ductivity requires adequate processing facilities. In one out
of three deals according to Land Matrix data, the produced
commodities are exported unprocessed. For this one-third of
deals hardly any employment creation is expected through for-
ward linkages, whereas the opposite might be the case for the
remaining two-thirds of deals. A key determinant for unlock-
ing the potential of forward linkages lies in the capital inten-
sity of the processing industry. This is nicely illustrated by
the examples of Brazil and Thailand. In Brazil large-scale
mechanized farming substituted capital for labor, resulting
in low employment creation and growing inequalities. In Thai-
land agricultural commercialization took a diﬀerent turn as
oﬀ-farm enterprises did not have access to subsidized credit
and, therefore, could not aﬀord labor-displacing technologies.
This consequently generated massive employment, especially
in the processing industry (World Bank, 2009).In sum, from a theoretical stance we would clearly expect a
change from a smallholder-dominated labor market to a labor
market dominated by industry and service. Empirically, the
picture is less clear as the literature also reports cases in which
technological changes have increased the demand for agricul-
tural labor. Employment creation in the industrial sector
through backward and forward linkages depends on the speci-
ﬁc country and sector contexts.
(b) Validity and limitations of the estimates
The validity of our results heavily hinges on the quality of
the Land Matrix data. While Land Matrix data were criticized
when ﬁrst published (see, for instance, Bra¨utigam & Zhang,
2013; Edelman, 2013; Oya, 2013), the data are now widely
used by researchers (see, for instance, Arezki, Deininger, &
Selod, 2015; Messerli et al., 2014; Osabuohien, 2014). The
Land Matrix Initiative is transparent about potential biases
in the data and does not claim to provide a realistic represen-
tation of reality (The Land Matrix Global Observatory, 2016).
In fact, due to the opaqueness surrounding many LSAIs, the
Land Matrix data are likely to underestimate the phe-
nomenon. Accordingly, the acquired areas as reported in the
Land Matrix can be considered a conservative estimate of
the overall phenomenon. Despite certain biases, we consider
Land Matrix data to be the most accurate information avail-
able and well suited to highlighting overall global trends.
The conceptual framework incorporates three key determi-
nants, which require some assumptions and simpliﬁcations
in their empirical application. First, input for the labor inten-
sities would ideally be calculated on an individual level or,
more precisely, on the basis of man-hours per hectare and
per crop. Because such disaggregated ﬁgures are not available,
we use the total employment numbers of each holding as
reported in the Land Matrix. Although the Land Matrix dif-
ferentiates the type of employment, only one out of ﬁve cases
explicitly state the number of seasonal workers. For the
remaining cases, we assume that seasonal workers are included
in the total employment ﬁgures. A conversion factor could be
used to translate these seasonal-employment ﬁgures into full-
time equivalents in order to account for the fact that seasonal
laborers only work part of the year. However, we consider
such a factor to be too arbitrary to account for the variation
in working hours of seasonal workers and instead treat sea-
sonal labor as full-time equivalents. In contrast, FAO’s Small-
holder Farmers’ Dataportrait accounts for the heterogeneity
to a certain extent by calculating labor input as the total num-
ber of person-days divided by the number of workdays in a
year. However, also person-days per workdays can be only
considered as a second best solution to address the labor input
compared to man-hours. More precisely, it lacks the detail to
distinguish between part-time and full-time during a workday
and therefore fails to fully capture time-related underemploy-
ment; a reality often found on smallholder farms owned by
families which would overstate the actual labor input. As a
result of these diﬀerent approaches, the labor input and there-
with the estimated labor intensities derived from Land Matrix
data could be overestimated. Although both overestimations
are likely to cancel each other out, the gross employment gen-
eration estimated in Table 3 should be considered an upper
bound estimate.
Second, we assume that the whole area acquired by an inves-
tor was to be cultivated. This is meant to give an idea of how
many jobs could potentially be created on the land acquired.
In reality, investors often lack the capacity to cultivate all
the land acquired, and, usually, not all of the land acquired
440 WORLD DEVELOPMENTis suitable for production; hence, only a fraction of the land
will be cultivated. This also adds to the overestimation of gross
employment generation through large-scale farms in Table 3.
However, we equally pretend the whole area was formerly
under production and thus overestimate the crowding out of
former employment. This is particularly important for land
formerly used by smallholder farmers. Consequently, the esti-
mate for employment losses of former smallholders is also an
upper-bound estimate.
Third, we cannot account for the quality of newly created
employment. Employment quality plays an important role as
there might be a huge diﬀerence between a self-employed
smallholder and a wage employee in terms of decency. One
important aspect in this context is that self-employed small-
holders usually operate in the informal economy and are hence
excluded from social security systems and lack adequate repre-
sentation. On the contrary, formal wage employees ideally
have access to these systems and are also able to express their
concerns through workers’ organizations. However, the trans-
formation from smallholder farming to wage employment can
heavily impact the social relations in communities and within
households. Ethnographic research on Vietnam (Dao, 2016)
and Indonesia (Julia & White, 2012) shows that employment
on plantations is often perceived as a downgrade. Households
that have lost agricultural self-employment have the possibil-
ity to compensate for their lost income by switching into wage
employment. Although fewer employment opportunities are
expected to emerge, overall compensation is still feasible since
many low-pay jobs are replaced by fewer better paid jobs.
Fourth, in terms of multicropping patterns and multiple for-
mer land uses, we assume that the total area of a holding —
and hence the labor input — is equally distributed across each
former land-use type and crop. As we do not know the real
share of an area attributed to various former land uses or
crops, this is a necessary assumption even though it can poten-
tially introduce biases. For instance, cases reporting two diﬀer-
ent crops are diﬃcult to determine. It could be diﬀerent plots
of land used for each crop or it could be multicropping — that
is, both crops sharing one plot through intercropping or suc-
cession planting. In the ﬁrst case, the area could be equally
or unequally distributed across the crops, whereas in the case
of multicropping the same plot of land is used for both crops,
meaning that an equal distribution across the two crops is very
likely. In both cases labor intensity is increased compared to
single-cropping, either through higher yields or through an
additional growing cycle in one season. However, when com-
paring the labor intensities of single-entry cases with multiple
entry-cases in our data, there are no major diﬀerences.
Fifth, in terms of production models there is obviously more
diversity than just contract farming and non-contract farming.
Moreover, even contract-farming arrangements exist in diﬀer-
ent forms and context conditions. The eﬀects of contract farm-
ing on participating farmers are diverse and a source of
controversial debate in the literature (Bijman, 2008; Minot,
2007). Diﬀerent contractual arrangements, diverse context
conditions, and an unequal power balance between the ﬁrm
and farmers may explain the variance in outcomes. We neglect
these variances in our analysis and only consider the sheer
prevalence of such agreements. However, we do use — when-
ever available — labor intensities for contract-farming
arrangements and thereby attempt to capture the importance
of diﬀerent production models with data based on real
contract-farming schemes.
Sixth, our analysis of net employment eﬀects is limited to
land formerly used by smallholders as we lack information
on the crowding out of former employment for other typesof land use. On the one hand, the acquisition of former small-
holder land is highly relevant as it concerns more than a third
of the acquired land, which is of major concern to opponents
of LSAIs. Hence, there certainly is a rationale to focus on for-
mer smallholder land. On the other hand, we have to bear in
mind that we expect the largest degree of crowding out to
occur on these areas and smaller degrees to happen on land
with other uses. Thus, our net employment estimates cannot
be transferred to other former land-use types. The eﬀects are
expected to be more positive in the other scenarios due to less
destruction of former employment.
Last, we deliberately choose to focus on employment eﬀects
and thus neglect other eﬀects associated with establishing a
large-scale farm. We do so to understand the very complex
eﬀects on the labor markets. At the same time, we are aware
of the profound and diverse eﬀects of large-scale farms on
the economic and social spheres of local communities as well
as on the environment (for instance, see Oberlack, Tejada,
Messerli, Rist, and Giger (2016) for a meta-analysis of case
studies on livelihood outcomes of large-scale land acquisi-
tions).
With all of these caveats in mind, the above-described
empirical exercise provides an empirical assessment of the
potential employment eﬀects of LSAIs. We provide a simple
but powerful tool to assess the direct employment creation
of investments by taking three decisive — albeit simpliﬁed
— factors into account. Using Land Matrix data implies that
we underestimate the overall phenomenon as the area
acquired is probably much larger. However, we believe that
Land Matrix data reveal accurate trends concerning these
three factors. Certain assumptions (e.g., about land distribu-
tion or the complete use of the acquired land) and simpliﬁca-
tions of complex issues (e.g., contract farming) are necessary,
though they lead to an upward bias in labor intensities and
demand of large-scale farmers. As a result, we tend to overes-
timate large-scale farms’ gross employment creation that we
consider to be upper bounds. Accordingly, the predicted val-
ues for net employment creation might — despite the negative
values — even be too optimistic. We therefore consider these
net employment eﬀects for land formerly used by smallholders
as a conservative estimate of employment losses. However, it is
important to bear in mind that this is hugely driven by the
crowding out of smallholder farmers (for which we also use
an upper-bound estimate) and that net employment eﬀects
are more likely to be positive for other land-use types.
Although our estimates should not be taken at face value, they
indicate overall trends of the direct employment eﬀects of the
diﬀerent scenarios in our transition matrix.7. CONCLUSION
This paper debates the employment eﬀects of large-scale
agricultural investments (LSAIs). It contributes to the debate
by providing and empirically testing a conceptual framework
on direct employment eﬀects. To this end, we identiﬁed and
discussed key determinants of these direct employment eﬀects:
(i) the former land-use, (ii) the crop cultivated, and (iii) the
production model applied. We summarize these key determi-
nants in a transition matrix to illustrate scenarios that could
potentially occur in the course of transitioning from the for-
mer land use to large-scale farming.
In our empirical application, we use Land Matrix data to
assess which scenarios actually occur in reality and then derive
implications for employment creation. The largest generation
of direct net employment is expected for investments that do
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activities and cultivate labor-intensive crops under contract-
farming schemes. However, Land Matrix data show that this
scenario only applies to a very small amount of the acquired
area. Instead, we ﬁnd that over a third of land targeted was
formerly used by smallholder farmers and that contract-
farming schemes are only used on 2 out of every 10 hectares.
This implies that crowding out of former smallholder farmers
is a serious issue. Moreover, capital-intensive crops are clearly
dominating, which hints at investors focusing on highly mech-
anized farming with low labor demand. Accordingly, direct
net employment creation for the great majority of LSAIs is
limited, and high hopes for massive direct employment cre-
ation through LSAIs are clearly misplaced.
Crowding out of smallholder farmers is a severe problem in
all regions, with some nuances. For instance, crowding out of
smallholders is most pronounced in the Asia and Paciﬁc region
while pastoralists are particularly aﬀected in Latin America.
Only about 20% of land is used to cultivate labor-intensive
crops, which is generally low; only in Africa is this share
slightly higher. Africa also reveals the highest amount of mit-
igation potential through contract-farming schemes.
We then derived the net employment eﬀects for land for-
merly used by smallholders for selected countries. We ﬁnd a
massive loss of employment (ranging between 28 and
75%), with the highest losses stemming from the cultivation
of capital-intensive crops. However, in few cases, we identiﬁed
a positive net employment eﬀect associated with the cultiva-
tion of labor-intensive crops in combination with contract
farming, suggesting that LSAIs may actually be capable of
creating net employment if a speciﬁc combination of key
determinants is in place. Although these results hint at large
losses for individual farming operations, the overall impact
on the population employed in agriculture at the national level
is for our sample below 1.5% and hence relatively small.
To assess employment creation triggered by large-scale
farms, it is essential to look into indirect eﬀects, which typi-
cally occur in the medium- and long-term. Such eﬀects are usu-
ally linkages to other sectors, but they also include price and
wage eﬀects on local markets. Price and wage eﬀects foster
growth of the non-agricultural sector, which can absorb the
released labor force with a certain time lag. New employment
opportunities might also emerge through backward and for-ward linkages. However, these indirect eﬀects cannot be
directly attributed to the setting-up of large-scale farms and
are hence diﬃcult to empirically assess. The indirect employ-
ment creation would need to be empirically addressed in order
to reveal the full employment potential of LSAIs.
Another aspect that deserves further attention is the formal-
ization of the labor market. While smallholder farming is, in
most cases, informal employment, large-scale farms provide
wage employment and usually pay taxes. This is linked to
the quality of employment. Further research is required to
assess the quality and decency of the employment opportuni-
ties created. In particular, to address the question of what
extent the wage-employment opportunities created are able
to compensate for the income lost by self-employed farmers.
The employment eﬀects of LSAIs depend on the speciﬁc
project. Looking at the overall picture, mechanized large-
scale farming creates (gross) employment but is unable to
absorb all the labor released from former income-generating
activities, in particular smallholder farmers. This requires tar-
geted policy responses in order to reach an inclusive and sus-
tainable development process. We recommend three measures.
First, it is essential to support alternative employment oppor-
tunities. Such measure might include creating employment in
the service and processing industries as well as providing voca-
tional training to released laborers in order to smooth their
transition into alternative employment. Key to this is support-
ing local industries, for instance the processing industry. In
this context, a social safety net is crucial to ensure a socially
responsible transition. Second, our analysis showed that some
LSAIs use more inclusive business models and hence increase
the potential to include local communities in development pro-
cesses. It is necessary to conduct further research on which
business models are successful in including local communities
and important that there is greater political support for such
models. Third, in certain contexts, for instance in areas with
high population densities and smallholder agriculture or pas-
toralism as key income generation strategies, LSAIs are likely
to lead to massive employment destruction with little or no
scope for mitigation. In these cases, governments are well
advised not to lease or sell land without having well-
elaborated active labor market policies and alternative
employment opportunities for crowded out land users.NOTES1. Another view is that smallholder farming is still the backbone of
global food security in the developing world. Tscharntke et al. (2012)
therefore suggests that there is a need to link agricultural intensiﬁcation
with biodiversity conservation and hunger reduction instead of
conventional intensiﬁcation.
2. We use the terms LSAIs and large-scale farms interchangeably. We
believe that the size of a farm best distinguishes the diﬀerent production
models; i.e., large-scale commercial and (often) mechanized farming, and
less mechanized smallholder farming. We acknowledge that smallholder
farmers not only produce for own consumption but may also produce
commercially for the market (see also endnote 5).
3. The Land Matrix Global Observatory is a global and independent
land monitoring initiative that promotes transparency and accountability
in decisions regarding land and investment. It records land acquisitions of
200 hectares and more in low- and middle-income countries that have
occurred since the year 2000. Further information can be found at http://
www.landmatrix.org/.4. These ﬁgures might even be underestimated since many surveys only
focus on the primary occupation of the respondent. Agricultural activities,
however, are often pursued as secondary or tertiary occupations and
therefore not captured by survey. Especially on family farms it is common
for household members to work on the farm in addition to their main job
in the industrial or service sectors. Consequently, the importance of farm
activities might be understated (Haggblade, Hazell, & Reardon, 2010).
5. There is no universal deﬁnition of ‘‘smallholder” or ‘‘family farmer”
(HLPE, 2013). Smallholder farming refers to the size of the farms;
however, the understanding of what is ‘‘small” depends very much on the
context. Most commonly, an upper threshold of two hectares is used to
identify smallholders. Family farming in turn refers to who owns and
works the land. Thus, farms that principally rely on a family labor supply
are considered family farms. While both concepts overlap, they are not the
same (Lowder, Skoet, & Raney, 2016). We use the term smallholder
farming in the following to distinguish smaller (often, but not necessarily,
family-operated) farms from large-scale farming operations; the latter are
identiﬁed by their size of two hundred hectares or more.
442 WORLD DEVELOPMENT6. Land Matrix data also record ‘‘intended” and ‘‘failed” deals and
include deals for other purposes, including mining and tourism. We hence
use a subset of 1,346 deals included in the Land Matrix. We also include
deals below two hundred hectares if the leased area combined with the
area under contract farming amounts to more than two hundred hectares.
7. Available at: http://www.fao.org/economic/esa/esa-activities/esa-
smallholders/dataportrait/farm-size/en/ (visited 26/09/2016).
8. Here we explicitly use the labor per area under production and not per
acquired area. This takes into account that the acquired area (i.e., the area
under contract) usually exceeds the area actually used for production since
investors typically do not immediately enter into the production phase on
the entire area acquired. Missing values in the size under production are
imputed by a simple mean imputation based on the ratio of the size under
contract and the respective size in production for all cases that have this
information.9. If the labor intensity of contract farmers was not available, we used
large-scale farmers’ intensity. The rationale here is that contract farmers’
labor intensity falls somewhere between that of smallholder farmers and
large-scale farmers, depending on their access to improved technologies.
Accordingly, we consider the labor demand of a large-scale farmer to be a
lower-bound estimate.
10. This also conﬁrms the ﬁndings of Messerli et al. (2014): Based on
detailed insights into the geographical contexts of land acquisitions, they
question the often postulated idea that targeted land is ‘‘idle” or
‘‘marginal.”
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Year Source
2007 Bathan and Lantican (2010), Arias, Dankers, Liu,
and Pilkauskas (2003), Bagamba, Ruben, and
Ruﬁno (2007)
1999
1999
2007
1999
1996–2002 Simpson and Cheong (2014), Garcı´a Bendezu´
(2011); Abreha (2007)2004–2008
2008
Table 4 (continued)
Crop Labor intensity
(workers per hectare)
Region Year Source
Cassava 0.06–0.13 Colombia 2000 Pimentel (2009), FAO (1977), Gray (1982), Ospina
Patin˜o, Cadavid Lo´pez, Garcı´a Gonza´lez, and
Alcalde Torres (2007)
0.12–0.21 Brazil 1982
0.41–0.43 Congo (DRC) 1977
0.85 Nigeria 1996
0.97–1.15 Uganda 1977
Corn (Maize) 0.04–0.68 Ghana 2009 Pimentel (2009), Garcı´a Bendezu´ (2011), Dutch
Jatropha Consortium. (2009), Deininger and
Byerlee (2011), Ngeleza, Owusua, Jimah, and
Kolavalli (2011)
0.17 Cameroon Unknown
0.19 Mozambique 2005
0.33 Indonesia 1996
0.41–1.10 Peru 2004–08
Cotton 0.03–0.17 Benin 1998 Minot and Daniels (2005), Tschirley, Poulton, and
Labaste (2009)0.04–0.28 Uganda Unknown
0.05–0.60 Mozambique Unknown
0.11–0.45 Zambia Unknown
0.16–0.46 Tanzania Unknown
0.19–0.38 Zimbabwe Unknown
Cocoa 0.30 Unknown 2013 Tiﬀen and Mortimore (1990), ICCO (2013)
3.25 Malaysia 1983
Coconut 4.50 Sri Lanka 1984 Tiﬀen and Mortimore (1990)
Coﬀee 0.25 Colombia Unknown SCP (2014), Robinson, Brahmananda, and
Deshpande (1983), Tiﬀen and Mortimore (1990)1.04-1-41 India Unknown
1.83 Java 1983
Grains (cereals) 0.01 Unknown Unknown World Bank (2011), Bustos et al. (2016)
0.02 Brazil 2006
Jatropha 0.04–0.49 Mozambique 2005 Deininger and Byerlee (2011), Mintz-Habib
(2016), Scharschmidt (2010), Dutch Jatropha
Consortium (2009), Arndt, Benﬁca, Tarp,
Thurlow, and Uaiene (2008); Worldwatch (2007)
0.1 Unknown Unknown
0.13–0.27 Tanzania 2001
0.21–1.30 India Unknown
0.42 Unknown Unknown
Oil palm 0.11 Indonesia 2012 World Bank (2011), Schwarze et al. (2015), Tiﬀen
and Mortimore (1990)0.35 Unknown Unknown
3.60–4.00 Malaysia 1976/1983
3.80 Nigeria 1987
5.00–7.50 Africa 1977
Rice 0.20–0.71 China/India 1995 Hossain (1998), Ngeleza et al. (2011)
0.39–1.17 Ghana 2009
Rubber 0.33 Cambodia 2007 World Bank (2011), Schwarze et al. (2015), Tiﬀen
and Mortimore (1990), Dararath, Top, and Lic
(2011)
0.42 Unknown Unknown
0.48 Indonesia 2012
2.10–2.85 Malaysia 1978/1983
Sorghum 0.05 Unknown Unknown World Bank (2011), Ainembabazi, Bashaasha,
Mugisha, Pender, and Hyuha (2005)0.83–1.09 Uganda 2000–01
Soya bean 0.02 Unknown Unknown World Bank (2011), Bustos et al. (2016), Pimentel
(2009)0.02 Brazil 2006
0.39 Philippines 1996
Sugar cane 0.14–0.66 Brazil 1982 Deininger and Byerlee (2011), Gray (1982), Arndt
et al. (2008)0.15–0.34 Mozambique Unknown
0.70 Tanzania Unknown
Sunﬂower 0.19 Mozambique 2005 Dutch Jatropha Consortium (2009)
Wheat 0.04–0.05 Ethiopia 1996–2002 Garcı´a Bendezu´ (2011), Pimentel (2009), Abreha
(2007), Simpson and Cheong (2014)0.06 Tanzania 2008
0.20–1.05 Peru 2004–08
0.36 Kenya 1996
Tea 0.20–0.80 Sri Lanka 1984 Tiﬀen and Mortimore (1990), Campbell (2017),
Grigg (1974)0.52 Kenya 1983
0.63 Java 1983
0.80 Malaysia 1983
3.5 India 1974
3.7–4.9 Unknown Unknown
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Table 5. Diﬀerent scenarios and acquired areas in hectares
Former land use Final land use Total (n = 1,031)
Large-scale farm
Labor intensive
(3,188,127)
Capital intensive
(9,390,727)
no CF CF no CF CF
Brownﬁeld investment Large-scale agriculture 2a 2b 2c 2d
Acquired area (in ha) 341,181 232,977 3,522,884 1,460,318 5,557,360
Greenﬁeld investment Smallholder agriculture 1a 1b 1c 1d
Acquired area (in ha) 1,511,032 154,730 2,075,338 485,182 4,226,282
Pastoralists 3a 3b 3c 3d
Acquired area (in ha) 202,069 2,952 426,773 20,550 652,344
Forestry 4a 4b 4c 4d
Acquired area (in ha) 693,060 10,711 743,480 181,905 1,629,156
Conservation 5a 5b 5c 5d
Acquired area (in ha) 37,477 1,939 422,970 51,327 513,713
Total 2,784,818 403,309 7,191,445 2,199,282 12,578,854
Source: Author’s calculations based on The Land Matrix Global Observatory (2016).
Note: CF = contract farming.
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